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1Chapter
Analog, Embodiment, and 
Freedom
Ted Gemberling
Abstract
Discussions of computer technology often touch on matters of free will. Can 
living organisms, especially human beings, be interpreted as like computers? Much 
writing on computers today assumes that digital technology shows freedom of the 
will is illusory. Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) had quite a bit to say about the freedom 
of the will and its relation to the laws of nature. This chapter provides evidence 
from a number of writers on computers and related matters which bears on his 
analysis. Peirce’s category of Firstness has a great deal to contribute to our under-
standing of freedom as well as human responsibility, but its true meaning requires 
quite a bit of explanation.
Keywords: computers, analog, digital, freedom, determinism, semiotics, esthetics, 
embodiment, algorithms, addiction
1. Introduction
Lots of evidence has accumulated that online content influences people. It has 
even been pointed out that computer algorithms sometimes know us better than 
we know ourselves. They can detect our interests by the searches we do and the web 
pages we open. If this were not so, businesses would not advertise on the Web. But 
does that mean we humans are just a slower, less systematic kind of computer? How 
different are computers and living organisms?
Peirce’s most difficult category is Firstness. It is difficult because it is about 
things before we really begin to think about them or even recognize their “other-
ness.” Secondness, which consists in that otherness, and Thirdness, which contains 
our categorizations or general conceptions of things, are fairly straightforward. In 
Peirce’s categorical system Firstness lies at the base of Secondness and Thirdness. 
Before anything is different or general, it is itself.
There is an enlightening passage where Peirce lays out the relation of Secondness 
to Thirdness:
I should not wonder if somebody were to suggest that perhaps the idea of a law is 
essential to the idea of one thing acting upon another. But surely that would be the 
most untenable suggestion in the world considering that there is no one who after 
lifelong discipline in looking at things from the necessitarian point of view has ever 
been able to train himself to dismiss the idea that he can perform any specifiable 
act of the will. It is one of the most singular instances of how a preconceived theory 
will blind a man to facts that many necessitarians seem to think that nobody really 
believes in the freedom of the will, the fact being that he himself believes in it when 
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he is not theorizing. However, I do not think it worthwhile to quarrel about that. 
Have your necessitarianism if you approve of it; but I still think you must admit 
that no law of nature makes a stone fall, or a Leyden jar to discharge, or a steam 
engine to work. ([1], pp. 89-90)
Here he is arguing against the popular “necessitarianism” of his day, which we 
generally call “determinism” in English today. Its claim is that every single fact of 
our experience is determined by natural laws. If you know the state of facts at any 
time, you can deduce what the facts will be at any other time by those laws ([1], 
p. 325). Peirce says this implies there is no real increase in diversity in the world. 
Whatever diversity exists today would have existed at the beginning of the universe. 
Natural processes only rearrange things; they do not create anything new ([1], 
pp. 334-335).
Now, actually, there are several objections one could make to the passage. The 
most obvious is that, of course, stones do fall because there is a law of nature, 
gravitation. What Peirce is saying is that when a stone falls, some other single entity, 
such as perhaps my foot hitting it, is the occasion for that law to operate. That is 
Secondness. He is arguing that my foot hitting the stone is not predictable by that or 
any other law.
A more difficult problem is his statement that no one can “train himself” to 
believe he cannot make certain choices. It seems people often do train themselves 
to believe that. In fact, maybe that is what depression consists in, the belief you 
cannot do things you would like to do. But I believe Peirce is speaking here in a more 
“ideal,” philosophical sense: does the philosopher really believe he cannot make 
choices?
2. Wilden on computer technology
How we understand the human brain has important implications for the free-
dom of the will. In a 1972 piece, Anthony Wilden lays out a distinction between 
“analog and digital communication” ([2], pp. 155-195). Wilden is attempting 
to show what elements of electronic technology may correspond to the nervous 
systems of organisms, and his discussion of analog and digital brings out some 
interesting parallels. He says our nervous system includes both analog and digital 
elements, laying out in detail how nerve axons transmit messages to the synaptic 
connections between cells. The transmission is at first an analog one, meaning 
that it is about “difference” on a continuous scale. Eventually the message passed 
in the axon reaches a certain “threshold,” and it becomes a matter of “opposition” 
rather than difference ([2], pp. 174-176). This is now a digital message. Wilden 
points out that genes are digitally coded but depend upon related enzymes, which 
are analog elements ([2], p. 158). Digitalization is always necessary whenever an 
important “boundary” or “frame” needs to be added to an analog continuum. As 
Wilden puts it:
[The organism] introduces a desired closure into a continuum, which distinguishes 
a certain “part,” and by the same act constitutes himself as distinct in some way 
from the environment he perceives ([2], p. 174).
The digital splits the world into discrete elements and helps us experience our 
individuality. The connection of this concept to Secondness is clear.
In another chapter of the same book, he suggests the analog may correspond to 
Peirce’s Thirdness, but he admits he does not understand Peirce’s categories very 
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well [3]. He suggests Firstness is the Real and Secondness, the Imaginary. This mis-
construes them. Something imaginary is a Second when we find out it is imaginary; 
until then, it is an aspect of our freedom, which is Firstness. As Peirce would put it, 
Firstness is the “monadic” aspect of our experience. He says:
I can imagine a consciousness whose whole life, alike when wide awake and when 
drowsy or dreaming, should consist of nothing at all but a violet color or a stink 
of rotten cabbage. It is purely a question of what I can imagine and not of what 
psychological laws permit ([1], p. 81).
Consciousness has this monadic aspect that is complete unto itself and not 
dependent on anything external. Firstness is predominant in the ideas of “freshness, 
life, freedom” as well as feeling, as opposed to perception, will, and thought ([1], 
pp. 78-79). When we find out something is imaginary, we are essentially acknowl-
edging a dyadic relation, a relation between what something is and what it is not 
(Secondness). There is also an element of Thirdness that comes into this, in that 
becoming convinced something is not real is coming to a sense of the persistence or 
stability of that reality ([1], p. 247). That is a triadic relation, because it involves a 
sense of connecting links between things, things yet to come as well as in the past. 
It is saying, “I will not see evidence of it in the future.” Thirdness has a necessary 
connection to future time. For example, evolution is Thirdness because it is the 
emergence of things in time. Education is Thirdness because it means becoming 
aware of more things and different categories of things.
3. Pre-Wilden views of analog and digital
Wilden cites John von Neumann’s classic work The Computer and the Brain ([2], 
pp. 157-158). Von Neumann talked about analog and digital computers but did 
not interpret human cognition in terms of the analog. Analog computers work by 
representing numbers by units of actual physical quantities, while digital machines 
represent them “as in conventional writing or printing, i.e. as a sequence of decimal 
digits” ([4], pp. 3, 6). He thought our cognition was basically digital with some ana-
log features ([4], p. 58). He emphasized the binary nature of nerve impulses. They 
were basically “on–off switches,” and he put less emphasis on the threshold features 
Wilden emphasized ([4], pp. 40-44). What is “non-digital-like” in our brains is the 
result of their working statistically rather than analogically. If we imagine comput-
ing machines to have existed prior to the human brain, we might say the brain gave 
up precision in arithmetic to gain “an improvement in logics” ([4], p. 80). The 
nervous system uses two types of communication, the “non-arithmetical” and the 
“arithmetical.” The latter includes “communications of orders,” which are logical. 
Our nervous systems require less “logical depth” than digital computers, so statisti-
cal information is adequate ([4], pp. 76-82).
Hubert L. Dreyfus conceptualized human cognition in terms of the analog in 
his 1965 book Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence but appears to have given up that 
understanding in his later work On the Internet (2009). In the first work, he lays 
out three areas that digital computers are unable to handle: fringe consciousness, 
essence/accident discrimination, and ambiguity tolerance [5]. Dreyfus’s conception 
of the analog appears to have influenced Wilden ([2], p. 157). One problem he lays 
out in some detail is language processing. It is difficult to understand language as 
simply a list of words in sentences constructed by rules. Dreyfus cites Wittgenstein 
on how our understanding of language appears to be inseparably connected to the 
way we live. Our lives provide us with the context that makes words and sentences 
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understandable ([6], p. 33). This is an example of “tacit” knowledge and ambigu-
ity tolerance. He cites Bar-Hillel for the view that machines can only make good 
translations of language if they can learn ([6], p. 35).
Dreyfus quotes a statement by Bullock on “graded synaptic potential,” similar to 
Wilden’s “threshold effects,” arguing that the nervous system is a “complex analog 
device” rather than digital ([6], p. 56). He goes on to speculate on “wet” computers 
that simulate the way the human brain works, perhaps taking the form of an analog 
computer using ion solutions whose electrical properties change to model relation-
ships. However, he cites Maurice Merleau-Ponty for doubts this would be adequate, 
since the human body as a whole plays an important role in facilitating intelligent 
behavior ([6], p. 59). This is the primary theme of Dreyfus’s later work, On the 
Internet.
4. Post-Wilden views of analog and digital
Dreyfus has made an ongoing effort to monitor the progress of Artificial 
Intelligence and appears to make an effort to evaluate it as generously as possible. 
For example, he admits the development of Google, with its weighting of web pages 
by their apparent importance to searchers, shows some of his skepticism was exces-
sive ([7], pp. 21-24). Google shows a computer can get a sort of indirect knowledge 
of what web pages are about without really understanding them ([7], p. 22). If a lot 
of searchers have shown interest in a page, that indicates something about its con-
tent. However, it says nothing about the correctness of the content. The interest of 
people in a page may be due to irrational factors or manipulation by the publisher.
Dreyfus says the big problem with AI is the computer’s lack of “embodiment.” 
Humans have common sense, and this is inextricably tied to our having bodies ([7], 
pp. 18-20). This appears to have replaced the concept of the “analog” for him. After 
all, analog computers are just another kind of machine. As Von Neumann showed, 
analog computers are used to do arithmetic ([4], p. 3). They are really just a dif-
ferent way to represent quantities. Our common sense comes from our not being 
machines.
However, there may be another sense in which the analog is relevant. Wilden 
pointed out that the human programmer provides a “necessary analog component 
to complement the amazing brute-force problem-solving capabilities of the digital 
computer” ([2], p. 157). Computers operate on codes, and a code as a whole is an 
analog of something. It is a way to get computers, with their ones and zeroes which 
are mostly meaningless to us, to do useful work by modeling some human activity 
such as writing or playing games. Von Neumann showed that digital computers 
have this power because they have memory ([4], pp. 19-20). This allows them to 
do things besides arithmetic. The programmer can instruct the computer to trans-
form its numerical memory into something non-numerical. Nonetheless, one can 
argue the computer has no knowledge of the world. It is primarily a kind of mental 
prosthesis that allows us to perform certain functions faster and more accurately.
There is a connection between this and Peirce’s semiotic theory. The computer 
code functions as a kind of “icon,” in that its relation to a human cognitive activity 
is one of similarity ([1], p. 102). The skill of the programmer consists in her ability 
to make the program as analogous to the human activity as possible, while making 
sure the computer is consistently able to perform the actions. When she does not do 
a good enough job, the program, and perhaps the computer as a whole, “crashes.”
In the book, Dreyfus makes a contrast between Plato, who pushed a “disem-
bodied” conception of human personality, and Nietzsche, who emphasized our 
embodiment ([7], p. 5). Dreyfus is particularly doubtful about the efficacy of 
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distance learning. He goes through the stages of learning from the novice, the 
advanced beginner, competence, proficiency, expertise and, finally, mastery and 
shows how the body and emotion are increasingly necessary as one progresses 
up the scale. Have not the Stoics and Descartes taught us that we make the most 
progress without emotion? ([7], p. 32) Dreyfus argues that learning above the stage 
of novice requires a level of emotion. We must want to succeed and worry about 
not measuring up. The teacher provides a model of commitment, and if we are not 
physically present with him or her, we lack the cues necessary for progress:
If the teacher is detached and computer-like, the students will be too. Conversely, if 
the teacher shows his involvement in the way he pursues the truth, considers daring 
hypotheses and interpretations, is open to students’ suggestions and objections, and 
emotionally dwells on the choices that have led him to his conclusions and actions, 
the students will be more likely to let their own successes and failures matter to 
them ([7], p. 33).
In a 2018 article, Beatrice Fazi attempts to build on the work of Gilles Deleuze 
to create a “digital esthetics” [8]. While Deleuze did not talk about computers very 
much, his work implied that the digital could not participate in the esthetic or creativ-
ity, central aspects of his philosophy. Digital computers depend on discreteness, on 
determinacy, but for Deleuze, indeterminacy was essential to life. Is there any way 
the digital can play a role in creativity? She surveys some attempts to make comput-
ers “creativity and esthetics friendly.” One approach is to link the operation of the 
computer to the lived experience of users (“embedded computing”). This provides an 
“analog” or “embodied” supplement to the computer’s cold, digital operation. Anna 
Munster made a particularly vivid attempt at this by emphasizing that the analog and 
the digital that come together in human-computer interaction are “more than the sum 
of their parts” ([8], pp. 12-13). Humans and computers working together have the 
potential to produce novel elements neither could produce on their own.
Fazi is not entirely satisfied with this solution. It is problematic because it ties 
the value of the digital to the analog (or embodied) elements, and she wants to 
believe the digital, or more precisely the computational, is valuable in itself. She 
calls her desired conception a “computational esthetics.” This must go beyond 
“the discrete features of digital technologies, such as digits and pixels” to include 
also the “finite steps that characterize computation as an axiomatic and algorith-
mic method” ([8], p. 16). She discusses the work of Alan Turing in formalizing 
the nature of computing processes. He showed they work via precise, finite 
routines, but also that certain problems could not be solved in this way. They are 
“incomputable” because the steps they require are infinite ([8], p. 21). Gödel’s 
Theorem showed that the computational depends ultimately on formal axioms 
arising from indeterminacy, since they cannot be deduced from the formal 
system themselves ([8], p. 20). Thus Fazi ends with a computational esthetics 
broadly compatible with Deleuze. The computational is valuable for its “system-
atizing and rationalizing logical capacity” ([8], p. 16) while not undermining 
indeterminacy and freedom.
5. The second cognitive revolution
A development bearing on all these questions is what has been called “the 
Second Cognitive Revolution.” Dreyfus was an important person in the history of 
this movement [9]. Rom Harré has summarized the direction of the movement by 
saying the earlier Cognitive Revolution was too focused on cognition as governed by 
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formal rules and schemata. It had been an advancement over earlier understandings 
which interpreted the mind as simply receiving external stimuli passively. We do 
not just respond to our environment; we also have complex “representations” of it. 
The movement drew on the work of Turing to conceive of the brain as an “informa-
tion processing device” ([10], p. 181). It was primarily digital in nature since digital 
computers contain representations of the world in their memories. By the mid-80’s, 
it was clear that a more subtle understanding of language was necessary to really 
understand human cognition. This involved rejecting the whole Cartesian model 
of thought as something internal and seeing how it functions within life as a whole, 
especially in its social aspects. Ludwig Wittgenstein had a major role here with 
his concept of “language games,” of language as a sort of set of recipes rather than 
formalizable rules. As Harré points out, the First Cognitive Revolution had been too 
trapped in “the presumptions of individualism” ([10], p. 181). In fact, social cogni-
tive processes precede individual ones.
In Dreyfus’s contribution to the same volume, he argues against the concept 
of representation altogether ([11], pp. 39-73). Drawing on the work of Walter 
Freeman, he argues for what he calls a “Heideggerian” or “Merleau-Pontian” artifi-
cial intelligence ([11], p. 58) to solve the “frame problem.” Both machines and living 
organisms encounter facts in the world, but the frame problem asks how a machine 
might be programmed so it can assign significance to novel facts. As he puts it, 
speaking of a closely related “binding problem”:
How can the brain keep track of which facts in its representation of the current 
world are relevant to which other facts? … [A]s long as the mind/brain is thought 
of as passively receiving meaningless inputs that need to have significance and 
relevance added to them, the binding problem has remained unsolved and is almost 
certainly unsolvable ([11], p. 59).
Drawing on Freeman’s work with rabbits, Dreyfus, in line with his emphasis 
on embodiment, argues that organisms select relevant elements in the world 
based upon their prior experiences and purposes (feeding, defense, reproduction, 
etc.). He lays out Freeman’s analysis of how “cell assemblies” in the animal are 
activated by sensory stimuli such as smell. These assemblies are self-organizing, 
bringing together different parts of the animal’s brain and body, not just passive 
receptors but directed by its active concerns. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, he calls 
the interaction of the organism’s nervous system and the environment “basins of 
attraction” ([11], p. 62). The binding problem is simply a result of trying to inter-
pret the animal from the researcher’s perspective rather than that of the animal 
([11], p. 61). He suggests machines might be designed to function the same way 
([11], pp. 68-73).
In the following chapter of the volume, H.M. Collins raises some serious 
problems with Dreyfus’s proposal [12]. The difficulty is that it does not explain 
what is unique about humans. As Terrence Deacon argued in his Symbolic Species 
[13], symbolization is what is distinctive to humans. We share with animals an 
immediate “indexical” (in Peirce’s terms) engagement with items in our environ-
ment (Seconds), but since we also use “symbols” (in Peirce’s sense), involving 
conventional (shared) signifiers for general aspects of the world (Thirds), an 
element of representation seems inherent to our cognition. It would seem, in fact, 
that this symbolic element must be “digital” in Wilden’s sense, in that it provides a 
stable, discrete representation of general aspects of the world while permitting us 
also to speak of particular things and persons (Seconds) and feelings and esthetic 
qualities (Firsts). As Peirce would say, it is only because we use the lower “iconic” 
and “indexical” forms of signs that symbols emerge as possible ([1], p. 115). The 
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meaningfulness of symbols stands on their foundation. Peirce’s pragmatic theory 
of meaning analyzes the meaning of concepts as generalizations of expected 
experience, which would have to take the form of indexes and icons ([1], 272-273. 
There Peirce seems to deny the iconic element, but if we understand the relation-
ship between indexes and icons in his understanding, an iconic element is insepa-
rable from indexes).
So where does that leave Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a collection 
of recipes, inextricably linked to our “embodied” ways of living? In reality, Peirce’s 
theory is very close to it. Words are only meaningful to the extent we have “inter-
pretants” for them, which are our habitual and fallible ways of seeing things as we 
consider signs [14].
6. Implications for free will
Another contribution in the same volume is “The Illusion of Free Will and its 
Acceptance” by Giuseppe Trautteur ([15], pp. 191-203). The purpose of the article 
is argue for what he calls “double feel” ([15], p. 199), the apparent truth that people 
can be both convinced that they have free choice and realize theoretically that 
there is no evidence for free will. He talks at length about the scientific evidence 
for free will and concludes it is not there. He even cites the experiments published 
by Kornhuber and Deecke which showed that neural commands initiating action 
precede our conscious awareness of making decisions ([15], p. 194). While he is 
aware of the indeterminacy of microscopic quantum events, he is convinced that 
macroscopic events are strictly determined by natural law ([15], p. 193).
Trautteur expresses a great deal of sorrow about this and says it cannot help but 
undermine ethics and religion ([15], p. 200). Why are we creatures that seem to insist 
on this illusion? Trautteur entertains the proposals of Clore and Damasio that we are 
born with “markers” for “cognitive feelings” such as the sense of volition ([15], p. 198).
To respond to this I would like to go back to something I mentioned at the 
beginning. Peirce criticized necessitarianism for denying that there is any increase 
in diversity in nature. Natural laws just rearrange the preexisting diversity. He 
thought this idea was intolerable for any view of the world that attempted to 
understand creativity in any sense. Firstness is manifested in the variety of the 
world, and perhaps one could even argue that “internet addiction” is somehow 
dependent on it. To borrow a phrase from Dreyfus, a person addicted to online 
content is not “detached and computer-like” ([7], p. 33). Our ability to get 
addicted appears to depend on computers showing us interesting things, and this 
depends on diversity. Without Firstness, the internet would be a bore. Especially 
with the development of the World Wide Web, digital computers can convey 
analog information like sights and sounds. They are not just for number crunch-
ing or word processing.
Peirce’s theory was that lawfulness (Thirdness) was growing in the universe. As 
he says:
At present, the course of events is approximately determined by law. In the past 
that approximation was less perfect; in the future it will be more perfect. The 
tendency to obey laws has always been and always will be growing. ([1], p. 358).
Perhaps we can move away from a focus on proving what determines each of 
our actions and consider the possibility that creativity itself is the best evidence of 
indeterminacy. Purely “free” choices do not have to happen constantly as long as 
they can happen at times.
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7. Computer algorithms and determinism: a case study
In a July 7, 2019 article in the New York Times, Patrick Berlinquette writes of his 
experiences using “The Redirect Method,” a program targeting Google searchers 
with ads to influence searchers’ behavior [16]. He acknowledges that marketers 
like himself profit by “exploiting impatience and impulsiveness,” but he wants to 
show online ads can do positive things, too. “Redirect” gives counter-messages to a 
person’s apparent interests. Berlinquette experimented on influencing two groups of 
troubled people, those who were suicidal and those who might become mass shoot-
ers. He was helped in setting up the programs by the experience of the National 
Suicide Prevention Lifeline and the Redirect Method’s experiences reaching out to 
ISIS sympathizers. The ISIS campaign provided Google with a blueprint that shows, 
step by step, how to create redirect ads to influence people. Google has a suicide 
algorithm, but it has gaps he attempted to fill. He says he would measure the success 
of his algorithm by how many people clicked on his ad and called the number on 
his web site, linked to the national helpline. There was a similar link for people who 
seemed interested in perpetrating shootings.
He was quite successful with suicidal people but not with shooters. With the 
first, the “conversion rate,” the rate of people responding, was 28% compared 
with the usual Google rate of 4%. With shooters, the success rate was low, though 
he does not give an exact percentage. Why would the success rate be different 
for the two groups? My guess is that it is not due to some flaw in his mass shooter 
algorithm, but because the desires of the two groups are different. Suicidal people 
usually want help. If someone reaches out, they will respond. People considering 
mass murders are not interested in talking to anyone, or at least the chance of 
their wanting to is much less. The explanation lies in their inner desires rather 
than some external manipulation. In Peirce’s terms, it is Firstness, not Secondness 
or Thirdness.
8. Conclusion
The 1975 film The Stepford Wives depicts a wealthy suburb of New York, 
Stepford, where wives appear to be unnaturally obedient to their husbands [17]. 
One wife moves to Stepford with her husband and gets progressively more worried 
the longer she is there. Every now and then, one of her friends suddenly changes to 
this unnaturally “submissive” personality. While it is a horror film, it’s difficult not 
to laugh when the women suddenly change. In real life, no one changes that way, 
even gradually.
I believe the analyses laid out by Peirce, Wilden, Deleuze, and Fazi make it 
highly doubtful computers can actually change our values. The most they can do is 
take advantage of desires we already have. Under their influence, we will do some 
things we would not otherwise have done, but our basic personal orientations will 
remain intact.
Thanks
I want to thank John Meador, Dean of UAB Libraries, for funding this project. 
Thanks also to my colleagues Laura Simpson, Kevin Hébert, Linda Burrow, and 
Dorothy Ogden for encouragement and help. I no longer work with them, but 
Valerie S. Gordon, Scott Plutchak, Susan Matveyeva, and Nancy Deyoe also deserve 
thanks. Finally, my learned late friend Lee Lowrie and Dr. Marge Steiner deserve 
praise for making my work possible.
9Analog, Embodiment, and Freedom
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89595
Author details
Ted Gemberling
University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, United States
*Address all correspondence to: tgemberl@uab.edu
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
10
Cognitive and Intermedial Semiotics
[1] Peirce CS. Philosophical Writings. 
New York: Dover; 1955
[2] Wilden A. Analogue and digital 
communication. In: System and 
Structure. London: Tavistock. 
1972:155-195
[3] Wilden A. System and Structure. 
London: Tavistock; 1972. pp. 267-268
[4] Von Neumann J. The Computer and 
the Brain. New Haven: Yale University 
Press; 1958
[5] Dreyfus HL. Alchemy and Artificial 
Intelligence. 1965. p. iii. Available from: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/papers/2006/P3244.pdf 
[accessed 2019-07-21]
[6] Dreyfus HL. Alchemy and Artificial 
Intelligence. p. 33
[7] Dreyfus HL. On the Internet. 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge; 2009
[8] Fazi MB. Digital aesthetics: The 
discrete and the continuous. Theory, 
Culture and Society. 2019;36(1):3-26. 
DOI: 10.1177/0263276418770243
[9] Leidlmair K. After Cognitivism: A 
Reassessment of Cognitive Science and 
Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer; 2009. 
p. vii
[10] Harré R. The second cognitive 
revolution. In: Leidlmair K: After 
Cognitivism. p. 181
[11] Dreyfus HL. How representational 
cognitivism failed and is being replaced 
by body/world coupling. In: Leidlmair 
K: After Cognitivism
[12] Collins HM. The new orthodoxy: 
humans, animals, Heidegger and 
Dreyfus. In: Leidlmair K: After 
Cognitivism
[13] Deacon TW. The Symbolic Species: 
The Co-Evolution of Language and the 
Brain. New York: W.W. Norton; 1997
[14] Gemberling T. FRSAD, semiotics 
and FRBR-LRM. Cataloging 
and Classification Quarterly. 
2016;54(2):138-139
[15] Trautteur G. The illusion of free 
will and its acceptance. In: Leidlmair K: 
After Cognitivism
[16] Berlinquette A. I used Google 
ads for social engineering. It worked. 
New York Times. 7 July 2019. Available 
from: https://www.nytimes.com 
[Accessed 2019-07-23]
[17] The Stepford Wives [Internet 
description]. 1975. Available from: 
https://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0073747/?ref_=nv_sr_2?ref_=nv_sr_2 
[Accessed 2019-07-23]
References
